Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

July 2019

Small-Scale Production and Meaningful Work: Toward a
Community of Gift and Craft
Stephen Michael Wolfe
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Wolfe, Stephen Michael, "Small-Scale Production and Meaningful Work: Toward a Community of Gift and
Craft" (2019). LSU Master's Theses. 4990.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4990

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION AND MEANINGFUL WORK:
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF GIFT AND CRAFT

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of Philosophy

by
Stephen Michael Wolfe
M.A., Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2016
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 2008
August 2019

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT...........................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................1
2. MEANING-INVESTING ACTIVITY..................................................................11
3. MEANINGFUL WORK........................................................................................19
4. SMALL-SCALE PRODUCTION.........................................................................24
5. THE MEANING IN ARTISANSHIP...................................................................34
6. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................54
REFERENCES........................................................................................................................57
VITA........................................................................................................................................61

ii

Abstract
Productive labor is often treated as a means for various ends—for money, leisure, play, etc. This
essay argues that work, depending its scale and its relation to community, can be worth doing for
its own sake—as an end in itself. Meaningful work is meaning-investing activity. In small-scale
production, which involves an intimate relation with the material and an application of practical
skill, the producers can invest products with higher-order meaning, imbuing upon them their
personhood by which they manifest themselves in public for recognition as persons qua workers
and for the judgment of others concerning the goodness of the product. The qualities of the
product (viz., thought embodied as functional and aesthetic qualities) are the reasons offered to
another on behalf of their productive activity. The recognition of the qualities as reasons
recognizes the producer’s personhood (for reasons are offered only between persons) and thereby
affirms that the activity was worth doing for its own sake. But this is not sufficient for the
perfection of work. Producers also crave judgment from the community on the goodness of the
product. In confirming the goodness of the product in judgment, the community (which must
also be small in scale) perfects the work for the worker.

iii

Chapter 1. Introduction
Protesting France’s refusal to join the Unites States in invading Iraq in 2003, American
conservative groups sought to strike at the heart of the French people. Hoping to cause great
offence, they poured imported French wine into the street gutter. Instead of exciting the palate,
the precious liquid slid down the storm drain. The act was, as one might expect, criticized in the
US, but not in the typical fashion: the wine-defilers were ridiculed for the self-defeating nature of
the act. After all, in order to dump wine in the gutter one must first purchase the wine. The
French already got what they ultimately wanted: payment. As Alan Reynolds from Cato Institute,
wrote at the time, “Any French wine available to be poured down the drain is wine that has been
paid for by some American. Destroying the wine after buying it does not hurt the French seller,
only the American buyer.”1 Indeed, even before the Americans purchased the wine both the
French producer and the international distributor already received payment. So it seems that the
American protesters’ stunt was self-defeating. The joke is on them, not the French.
But, despite the silliness of these acts, the wine-defamers recognized something
important about the wine and the work put into it. They recognized that products made with
personal care and concern carry with them a value that transcends their price. These products
secure for the producer more than mere revenue or profit. They are, I submit, imbued with the
producers’ aspirations for meaningful work, which finds completion not in the termination of
work but in the use of the product by another. The protesters indeed recognized something
crucial and yet elusive about the wine, namely, that pride, tradition, personality, and even a
people’s collective sense of themselves went into its production. The French producers had a
stake in the product achieving its ends: fellow human enjoyment. Their work was for others. The
Alan Reynolds, “Why Boycotting Wine Won’t Work,” Cato Institute, accessed from
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-boycotting-wine-wont-work.
1
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producers’ satisfaction was bound up in the consumers’ proper use and enjoyment of the product.
Dumping it down the drain was an affront on the producer.
This producer/product connection is one expression of the much broader human need to
invest the world in their activity with a significance irreducible to the material world itself. This
investment elevates the world with human sentiment, constructing a social world, as if making
pure nature into our image—from bare material (and market value) to something worthy of care,
concern, and conservation. This term “investment,” which I frequently use in this essay, refers to
what Edmund Burke called “the decent drapery of life,” which he defined as “all the super-added
ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the
understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature, and to
raise it to dignity in our own estimation.”2 The social world is an investment overlaid by human
activity on the natural world, imbuing it with social meaning that makes possible our ability to
relate to others in dignified, collaborative, and mutually understood and elevating ways. Though
super-imposed upon the world, this social world is nevertheless the principal feature of the world
as we relate to it. To it we go to express our highest worth to others and to recognize that worth
in others.
Our activity in the world forms relationships between people, places, and things. A house
becomes a home as we act, often with others, in and on it. There is good reason behind what
often seems sentimental in our talk of “home”—our activity has elevated it beyond a mere house
among houses and a site for security. It remains these things; however, it has been invested as
place of dwelling by our activity in it; and even upon moving to a different house, it remains
more than a house among other houses. One continues to own it in sentiment. Such places are
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by L. G. Mitchell (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993 [1790]), 77.
2
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more than useful and valuable on the housing market, and the loss or damaging of them by the
unwelcomed hands of others is beyond the jurisdiction of commutative justice.
Hence, the violation of these meaningful things and places is more and greater than a
violation of property or material damage. It constitutes a deep-seated loss—as if one’s self or
person is violated, as a sort of desecration. Property theft from one’s home, whether by burglary
or robbery, produces a feeling of loss greater in quality than the market value of whatever items
were lifted from the house; one’s relationship to the house has shifted: from a comforting
familiarity to disquieting foreignness, as if tainted by an unwelcomed, foreign activity. A place
for tranquil activity has been violated and made a place of uncertainty. The home-ness of the
house, though immaterial to the house, is the principal feature of the house. In our experience,
what matters most is the invasion of the home, not simply the theft of property.
As we saw with the guttered wine, products of labor can also be objects of such care and
concern—objects that have been elevated beyond simple consumability and usefulness—and
imbued with significance that can receive a sort of desecration at the hand of others. This essay
shows that, like a house, higher-order features can be predicated of products of work such that
place-making3 and meaningful work belongs to the genus of meaning-investing activity.
These inescapable features of the human being and the human social world, which
receives a greater treatment in the next section, is the ground of my argument in this essay. I
argue that labor can and even ought to produce products that enter a social world with a meaning
higher than market and use values, as things invested with an enduring presence of their makers,
as if the producers are embodied in the products, continuing to own them in sentiment even after
exchange. Such products present the producers before the world via their products.
I do not discuss place in detail. See Jeff Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophical
Topography, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2018).
3
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Meeting certain necessary conditions, work elevates the producer into the realm of the
personal by addressing others as persons in the work by means of the product, for the product’s
qualities are reasons offered for the goodness of one’s work—reasons being the material cause
of inter-personal relations in meaning-investing activity. In the product, the producer’s
personality as worker is manifested for others, and in so doing, the producer and consumer
address each other as persons, each capable of the faculty of judgment, treating each other as
ends in themselves. The social investment that raises work into personal relations of production,
though irreducible to the materiality of the product, becomes the principal end of production
itself; and for this reason, conducting this sort of work is not merely a means, either to a wage or
revenue, but is also and chiefly an end in itself. For any activity performed for and in recognition
of personhood is worth doing for it’s own sake.
Hence, on this account of production, exchange, and consumption, the use of the product
is ancillary to the ultimate end of production. The chief end is the recognition of persons,
particularly the person as manifested via products as a worker, and thereby raises productive
work itself to an end in itself. That is to say, the products of productive work facilitate the mutual
recognition of the personhood of both the producer and the consumer—both serving as
symbiotes in a symbiosis of production and consumption. By “end in itself,” I mean that by the
activity itself one achieves the principal good sought in it. Put negatively, the activity is not a
means to another activity by which one achieves the chief good sought; the good is achieved in
the activity itself. This does not preclude subsequent, ancillary conditions for the realization of
this good, for it is not necessary that one realizes the good of an activity at the time of conducting
it. A composer, for example, seeks the best setting for the performance of some composition, but
the setting, while necessary for the performance of the composition, is only ancillary to the
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achievement of the good sought in musical composition. Similarly, in work one must bring the
product to some sort of exchange (or as a gift), but the act of exchange is not the principal end
sought in production. Rather the exchange is an ancillary condition of that end. The realization of
the good then is retroactive—the worker comes to see past work as work performed for its own
sake. Furthermore, this does not preclude the realization of goods in consequence of the activity,
such as revenue or wages. Hence, the fact that meaningful work serves as a means to various
ends does not preclude it from being principally an end in itself.
What is unique about this approach is that while it affirms many common intuitions of
meaningful work, such as the necessity of individual creativity, self-satisfaction and
independence, it takes it a step further by linking such work to other persons and thereby raising
it into the distinctively human features of human society. Instead of describing meaningful work
as quasi-solipsistic—as something satisfying apart from the satisfaction of others—this essay
shows that meaningful work at its highest potential is a matter of both the type of labor and type
of community in which one labors. Community has an essential role in meaningful work.
Longfellow’s stoical village blacksmith who “earned a night’s repose” for “something attempted,
something done” was only half correct, as was Dorothy Sayer who said that “to aim directly at
serving the community is to falsity the work; the only way to serve the community is to forget
the community and serve the work.”4 On the contrary, work must be both done well and for the
community.
This study does not describe what makes work satisfying, happiness-producing, or even
“meaningful,” according to popular usage, for the typical worker in today’s capitalist economy,

Dorothy Sayers, “Why Work?,” Accessed on 4/13/2017 at http://tnl.org/wpcontent/uploads/Why-Work-Dorothy-Sayers.pdf.
4
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yet I have no intent on disparaging the literature on those topics.5 Nor is my intent to contribute,
at least directly, to the literature on the “corrosion of character” caused by late capitalism.6 My
intent rather is to describe how work can become an end in itself i.e., worth doing for its own
sake. This sort of work is what I mean by “meaningful work.” Whether such work makes people
happy, I’ll let others decide.
The two basic requirements that I’ve identified—the manner of work and working in a
particular type of community—both concern scale. Hence, only some work is meaningful work,
according to my definition: The sort of work that engenders intimacy and requires the application
of hands-on skill with direct intention on material. But it is only potentially meaningful, for the
product must appear in a community with a scale permitting personal relations of production and
consumption. In this way, my account of meaningful labor is suitable for and even works to
justify many of the “third-way” approaches to political economy described best with E. F.
Schumacher’s title, “Small is Beautiful” or Kirkpatrick Sale’s “Human Scale.”7 My account is
however not fully consistent with socialism or liberalism, the adherents of which have regularly
rejected the small-scale or the “petite bourgeoisie” as “economic romanticism.”8
Still, this account of meaningful labor does not call for the end of capitalism or for
economic revolution. Rather, in application, it calls for individuals in the quotidian aspects of life
See for example, Steger et al. “Measuring Meaningful Work: The Work and Meaning Inventory
(WAMI)” in Journal of Career Assessment, 20(3) 322-337.
5

See Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the
New Capitalism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998).
6

Kirkpatrick Sale, The Human Scale (New Catalyst Books, 2007 [1980]); Human Scale
Revisited: A New Look at the Classic Case for Decentralist Future (Chelsia Green Publishing,
2017); and E. F. Schumacher Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (Harper
Perennial, 2007).
7

See V.I. Lenin’s “A Characterization of Economic Romanticism”
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1897/econroman/index.htm.
8
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to reassert their independence in labor and to affirm each other in it. Change in these matters
should begin not with a top-down tear-down of the system and a take-over of the means of
production, but rather from below, in everyday life—demanding more from us than a set of
tweets and participating in public outrage. Realizing communities of meaningful work requires
us to be personal with and for others in unobserved places and contexts, not concerning ourselves
with the illusion that others are watching and that they care. It’s to persons face-to-face that we
go, and in so doing reassert the primacy of the local in the formation of meaningful work.
Method and Summary
I rely on phenomenological descriptions of the human person’s relationship to the
world—that humans necessarily invests the bare, material world in meaning with a superadded
social significance irreducible to and undiscoverable on, in or, with the material itself. Such
investment is accomplished by meaning-investing activity, and work can be one such activity. To
support this contention, I appeal to common experience, which requires the reader’s willingness
to reflect on one’s own set of relations towards things and places that have, in experience, such
higher-order meaning. I also appeal to the illuminating descriptions of work from the pens of
artisans and theorists of craft.
I organize the argument using the terms of Aristotelian material logic, such as genus and
species. This is not to endorse or implicitly rely on Aristotelian metaphysics. Rather, I’ve found
these terms to be useful in delineating my argument (See Figure 1). When I say that small-scale
production is meaningful work and meaning-investing activity, I’m identifying two sorts of
genera (proximate and remote) to which small-scale production belong (viz. these can be
predicated of small-scale production). This means that when describing the essential features of
each genus I’m also describing features of small-scale production, for something belonging to a
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genus means having all that is essentially true of that genus. The chapters are organized as a
movement down from genera to species. In other words, I’m moving from those features that
small-scale production shares with other activities down to what differentiates it in species from
all other activities. Furthermore, since two species of the same genus share what is common of
the genus, it can be helpful to describe a more familiar species to clarify the nature of a less
familiar one. This is why I devote some attention to literary work, which I take to be a species of
the same genus (meaningful work) as small-scale labor and hence shares with it what is essential
of the genus. For these reasons, the reader should keep in mind that even when I am not directly,
exclusively, or explicitly addressing small-scale work, I am nevertheless describing it as I
progress from its non-distinguishing features to its distinguishing feature.

I begin my discussion by describing the remote genus of small-scale production, what I
call meaning-investing activity. I then proceed to describe meaningful work as a proximate
genus—of which both literary work and small-scale production are species. Literary work and
small-scale production share the same proximate genus. I describe the meaningfulness of small-

8

scale production synecdochally by describing artisanship in detail, which is one form of smallscale production.
Meaningful work is the sort of work that, due to its scale, makes possible an intimate
connection between the producer and product such that one can look upon it as “mine” even
when the right of use or ownership has been terminated by exchange (or by publishing contract).
That is to say, products manifest to producers their labor embodied, as a sort of mirror by which
one encounters oneself for contemplation. The producer, being bound up in the product, publicly
seeks both recognition as a person through it and judgment from other persons concerning its
goodness. The qualities of the product (i.e., thought embodied as functional and aesthetic
qualities) are the reasons offered to another on behalf of their activity; this distinguishes smallscale production from literary work (which communicates thought via words). The recognition
by others of the qualities as reasons eo ipso recognizes the producer’s personhood, for reasons
are offered only between persons and thereby affirms that the activity was worth doing for its
own sake.
But such work is completed or perfected only when the producer’s assertion of goodness
is judged as good by the community. Recognizing that a product embodies reasons for its
goodness does not eo ipso recognize those reasons as good reasons (viz. that the product is a
good product). Work was worth doing for its own sake (that it was meaningful work) by an act
of recognition and it was judged good by an act of judgment.
Crucial to the possibility of judgment is the scale of the community. By “scale of the
community,” I refer to the geographic boundary between producer and consumer beyond which
the consumer is unable to adequately communicate judgment to the consumer. Prior to the
internet, the most suitable community would seem to be the small one, for in a small community

9

workers are able to see their products in the service of other's good and people are able to
provide feedback in person. In an age of internet “reviews” and online feedback, scale might
appear to be increasingly obsolete. I will not discuss these complexities here, though they do
raise important questions. The principle is that meaningful work requires the interaction of
persons before one another in some capacity, which typically occurs and historically occurred
when people are geographically proximate to one another. I doubt that the internet can fully
facilitate such interactions, though I acknowledge that globalized communication and
transportation has opened up markets and have become crucial for the success of many smallscale producers. Regardless of the mode of communication and which mode is best, the
principles and end of community vis-à-vis meaningful work still apply. Furthermore, while
market mechanisms are generally effective in communicating to producers what consumers want,
these are impersonal mechanisms. And as economist Wilhelm Ropke said, “Impersonal work has
its counterpart in impersonal consumption.”9 The market signals for one only to continue
producing; it cannot affirm the nature of the work, nor can it recognize and affirm the personal
relation generated in products by the work.

Wilhem Ropke, A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market, translated by
Elizabeth Henderson (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), 71-72.
9
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Chapter 2. Meaning-Investing Activity
The meaning generated from meaning-investing activity refers to those features that
emerge from human activity that are superadded, intersubjective, and irreducible to the material
world. They arise from a distinctive power of the human being that effectively constructs and
maintains our social world. This world is the plane on which we appeal to persons—as I-You
encounters—making judgments and giving reasons and justifications for our behavior. We are,
for this reason, not merely acting and reacting beings, but beings that offer reasons as
justifications for our actions and we in turn call other people to account, with reasons, for their
actions.
Since at least Descartes, and especially since Darwin, Western philosophy has been
preoccupied with analyzing human existence and the human social world in light of the
remarkable explanatory power of modern natural science. The philosophical problems arising
from these successes are numerous, including issues concerning free will, human responsibility,
ethics, the mind in relation to the brain, etc. Modern evolutionary biologists have relentlessly
tried to explain human behavior with evolutionary theory, and in doing so they have
compounded the philosophical problems. Evolutionary explanations seem to question the truth of
basic judgments of human experience. If, for example, the human enjoyment of music is simply
a function of natural selection or some mating advantage, then what do we say about the value or
the meaningfulness of the inter-personal reasons offered to others for our enjoyment of it and for
our preferring this or that music or composition?10 And what do we say of our reasons for loving
another? Only ironically could we say to a lover that our love is pure biology. Why is a house

On this problem in music, see Roger Scruton, Understanding Music: Philosophy and
Interpretation (Bloombury, 2016) and Charles Taylor, Language Animal: The Full Shape of the
Human Linguistic Capacity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 239-246.
10
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more than a shelter for self-preservation and survival but also and more importantly a home?
There seems to be over-determination: our enjoyment of music, our love for particular others,
and the home-ness of our house are explained adequately, it would seem, with both evolutionary
biology and non-scientific reasons offered as justifications; and the latter appears to be
irreducible to the former. That is, our non-scientific reasons are not in content grounded in
scientific explanation. There are dual explanations, and neither relies on the other and neither
uses the same mode or method of analysis. There seems then to be two realms: one of natural
science and one of human experience. But are these ordered in some way? Is one primary over
the other? Is one true and the other false?
The many solutions offered are, as one could guess, dualistic. They involve ceding the
ground claimed by the modern scientists in order to posit an additional mode of understanding
the world. Spinoza, for example, while affirming one world, thought that it could be explained in
two incommensurable ways—in thought and in extension.11 Each could exhaustively explain the
world, and neither mode of inquiry could reach the other. Kant, responding to Hume’s
skepticism, argued for a distinction in the understanding, in which one can know both causality
and practical reason, the latter being the knowledge of duties and personhood. In these views,
however, nothing arises or emerges from the other.
Despite proving unsatisfactory for many philosophers, the dualistic approach is still
common. Wilhelm Dilthey’s view of Verstehen points towards what is, to my mind, a more
helpful resolution to the problem;12 and many subsequent theories, from Wilfrid Sellars to Daniel
See Roger Scruton, Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986).
11

Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences in Selected
Works, ed. R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi, vol. 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
12
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Dennet,13 reflect Dilthey’s influence. Verstehen is an interpretative stance towards social
phenomena. It is an analysis not seeking to explain human behavior, but to understand it on the
basis of the reasons offered, the motivating emotions, and the meanings assigned to places and
things. As Roger Scruton describes it,
It is a way of conceptualizing the world that emerges from our interpersonal
dialogue. It is when addressing you as an I like me that I describe the world in
terms of the useful, the beautiful, and the good, that I deck out the deliverance of
the sense in emotional colors, that I draw your attention to things under such
descriptions as graceful, delicate, tragic, and serene. In science, we describe the
world to others; in Verstehen we describe for others.14
The for-others nature of Verstehen is the realm in which we offer reasons to others for our
actions and belief. It is not something one can observe and describe when outside the particular
intersubjective mode of relations. That is, even if one had a god-like objective view of human
beings (assuming a god unable to know the intersubjectivty of humans), this god could exhaust
the knowledge only of a certain type, namely, the knowledge of natural science, objective facts,
and perhaps evolutionary explanation. Observing mate-selection cannot reach the subjective
consideration of love, nor comprehend the nature of the reasons offered for mutual love. The
experience of beauty, both natural and human-made, might have its evolutionary explanation, but
the experience of beauty is not experienced as a function of natural selection; it is experienced as
something wholly different—as something to be contemplated and discussed with others using
non-evolutionary and non-scientific terms.
The human social world, however, arises from the natural world, but it is not identical to
the natural world. Indeed, it seems that the social realm is incommensurable with the science
realm. Sellars and others take this view, labeling one the “space of law” and the other “space of
Daniel Dennet, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).
Roger Scruton, Soul of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 33. See also
John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) and Robert
Brandom, Reasons in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
13
14
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reason.” This follows from his early work in which he famously distinguished the “scientific
image” and the “manifest image.”15 Our everyday mode of existence is within a space of reasons.
That is to say, we cannot justify ourselves—our beliefs and actions—by means of mechanistic
explanation. Our experience of ourselves and with others always assumes existence in a plane of
inter-personal relations that transcends the natural, mechanistic world. By their activity in a
world with others, persons construct and impute upon the material world ontologically intersubjective features upon which we have our social being and by which we communicate with
other persons our cares, loves, concerns, longings, rights and responsibilities.
In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle describes the ontology of social facts
and explains helpfully how we construct this social world. Searle begins by making a
fundamental distinction “between those features of the world that exist independently of us and
those that are dependent on us for their existence.”16 Objects in the world can have both
ontologically objective features and ontologically subjective features, the former referring to
features of objects that exist apart from any subject’s attitude or intention relative to it and the
latter referring to features that are “observer or user relative.” A screwdriver, he states, has
objective and “intrinsic” features (i.e., its material composition); and yet it also has “subjective”
or extrinsic features, revealed in its usefulness as a screwdriver. This feature of the object exists
only due to the “intentionality of observers, user, etc.” He goes on to speak of “social facts,”
which make up our social reality, as the products of “collective intentionality.” These “we

Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and Scientific Image of Man,” in Science, Perception, and Reality.
Austin: Ridgeview, 1963), pp. 35-78.
15

John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 9. See also Intentionality: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and, especially, Making the
Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
16
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intentions” are individuals intending as part of the collective intending. That is, they are united
on particular attitudes towards some object, activity, institution, place, rule, etc.
According to Searle, we have the unique capacity to assign “status functions” on
“objects and people” (and I’d add, places) that “cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of
their physical structure.” He continues, “The performance of the function requires that there be a
collectively recognized status that the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status
that the person or object can perform the function in question.”17 His examples include private
property, a twenty-dollar bill, and university professors as things that have “a collectively
recognized status that enables them to perform those functions.” The object or person can
perform some collectively assigned function only on account of its status in the social world.
These status functions necessarily come with what Searle calls “deontic powers,” which he
identifies as “right, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements,
and so on.” And these create “reasons for acting that are independents of our inclinations and
desires.”18
Searle, to my mind, is on the right track in exploring the principal ways by which human
construct and consent to a social world. Humans have a higher-order faculty by which we
construct common agreement that imputes function, roles, meanings, etc. to people, things, and
places from which arise responsibilities, duties, manners, rules, laws, civil sacrality, and rights.
We can assign status functions or features to things that are irreducible even to their assigned
use-functions in human activity. We can assign meaning to things (and places) for purely interpersonal ends. These higher-order features make possible the “we-consciousness“—a social life

17

Searle, Making the Social World, 6.

18

Ibid, 9.
15

in which all are constantly acting for, against, with, and in reaction to others in accordance with
principles, rules, and reasons.
The activity that establishes and sustains this social world of higher-order features is what
I call meaning-investing activity, and my argument is that work can be such an activity to the
fullest extent. Meaning-investing activity is any human activity in the world that constructs and
maintains our social world of inter-personal relations through places and things in the world,
which extends from the mundane to the sacred—viz., from rule-making in places (e.g., quietness
in a library) to the establishment of monuments for civic memory and the sacralization of gravesites. All of these involve the imbuement of features on the world unapparent upon scientific
analysis. Such features fundamentally call others to respond in particular ways in relation to
things and places solely on account of reasons offered through or in them. By “reasons,” I refer
to any means of persuasion that seeks to convince one to respond solely on account of the
goodness of the reasons offered, not due to any physical or psychological coercion — reason
alone determines the will. In choosing to participate in various activities in society, we are at
least tacitly consenting to the various reasons (or rules) embedded in those contexts and therefore
subject ourselves to correction (whether official or unofficial) in the event of our failure to
respond appropriately. But being corrected is recognition of one’s personhood—as one who can
apprehend and choose to follow these inter-personal rules.
Meaning-investing activity has one additional and I think higher effect upon places and
things. Human activity in the world can imbue things and places with personal affection and
significance such that the things and places, to us, take on a value that transcends any use-value
and exchange-value. The home/house distinction is again a helpful example. As a site in which
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memories seem lodged, a home has an additional value beyond resale value.19 Family heirlooms
is another, which has intergenerational significance. An old chair, on which one’s deceased
relative sat, takes on significance above and beyond any market value. We relate intimately with
thing and places on and in which our ancestors acted. Coming upon his father’s house and land,
Cicero wrote, “We are somehow moved by the places in which the signs of those we love or
admire are present.”20
In our own activity with things and places, we extend an elevating affection and
subsequently identify with them, as if our concerns have been lodged in them. This is one of the
great insights of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s novella The Little Prince, in which a prince devotes
considerable attention to the growth and care of a flower only to realize that there is objectively
nothing special about it. But his fox, which he tamed, says to him: “Go look at the roses again.
You’ll understand that yours is the only rose in all the world.” The Prince goes and observes all
the roses, including his own, and says to the roses,
“You’re lovely, but you’re empty,” he went on. “One couldn’t die for you. Of course, an
ordinary passerby would think my rose looked just like you. But my rose, all on her own,
is more important than all of you together, since she’s the one I’ve watered. Since she’s
the one I put under glass. Since she’s the one I sheltered behind a screen. Since she’s the
one for whom I killed the caterpillars (except the two or three for butterflies). Since she’s
the one I listened to when she complained, or when she boasted, or even sometimes when
she said nothing at all. Since she’s my rose.“21
His fox then says to him, “One sees clearly only with the heart. Anything essential is invisible to
the eyes....It’s the time you spent on your rose that makes your rose so important.” The crucial
insight here is that an intimate involvement with some thing engenders a unique relation, one that
See Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, translated by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press,
1994 [1958]).
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is irreducible to and indiscernible from its material composition and yet is an unavoidable
consequence of devotion to it. What is objectively common or valueless could, for this reason, be
subjectively or intersubjectively invaluable.
But this relation is not mere sentimentality. Rather, through such relations of engendered
affections, one can assert personality such that respect for the thing by another eo ipso recognizes
the one who intimately relates to it. In other words, the identification between person and thing,
arising from meaning-investing activity, makes the thing an extension of one’s personality in the
world—as a manifestation of one’s self before others. Hence, one respects another’s home not
merely because it is their property (or at least legally occupied), but because it is a home: a site
on which a particular people have stamped their right to dwell. At the same time, the home is a
place of responsibility: a site from which one fulfills obligations to others for the common good.
Whatever is true of meaning-investing activity, as to its comprehension, is true of
meaningful work, for as I will show below meaningful work is meaning-investing activity. In
productive labor, workers offer reasons as persons to other persons by means of the products for
their labor and its goodness. This is possible because of the person/product relation engendered
from the scale of production, which permits both mutual recognition of personhood between
producer and consumer, making the work an end in itself, and a judgment that can perfect the
work.
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Chapter 3. Meaningful Work
This chapter describes the proximate genus of small-scale production, what I call
meaningful work (which is also the genus of literary work). In the previous section, I argued that
features of our social world are ontologically subjective—being extrinsic to the material itself—
existing on the surface of the material world as investment, in the form of reasons, duties,
obligations, etc. by which we address persons as persons ourselves. All that is comprehensible in
meaning-investing activity is comprehensible under meaningful work, i.e., meaningful work is
meaning-investing activity. Hence, the characteristics of meaning-investing activity identified
above are true of meaningful work. This chapter demonstrates this and discusses what is
distinctive of meaningful work itself.
The distinctive features of meaningful work as a genus is that the worker engages in
some productive activity that forms an intimate attachment to the thing produced such that
you, the producer, see yourself in the thing produced—as a thing embodying your
personhood as worker. The product with this embodiment is not itself the person, as if
persons can recreate themselves into things. Rather the product has become the vehicle
through which one asserts personhood before others, demanding recognition by means of
the product as one who worked and identifies with it and offering oneself for judgment
through it. The products embody reasons—either in words or qualities, as we’ll see—
offered to another person as a sort of proposal to others for the goodness of one’s laboring
activity. The consumer’s acknowledgment of that higher-order signification and their
judgment of those reasons as good completes the work, for the offering of reasons to justify
one’s activities is always intended for others’ acknowledgment and judgment. If products of
meaningful work embody reasons on behalf of one’s activity, then the consumer—the

19

acknowledging and judging agent—is essential to the perfection of work. By recognizing
not only that the work of another was intended for some consumer’s good but actually
realized the consumer’s good, the consumer recognizes the worker both as a person and as a
person who worked well. Meaningful work therefore is productive activity that produces
products by persons, for persons, and between persons with higher-order significance by
intimate activity with the material in order to perfect work and contribute to the common
good.
To illuminate the nature of meaningful work, it will be helpful to discuss literary work,
which is small-scale production’s fellow species in the genus. The features that they share are
more obvious in literary work than small-scale production, and I assume that my audience is
more familiar with literary work.
Literary work expresses meaningful work in its chief products, published writings. Each
person’s published work is set apart from others as being in some sense “mine,” even when the
writer no longer has the right of use or distribution. When one writes a book, receives it, and puts
it on one's bookshelf, it is not just another book among books; it is the author’s book. It
embodies thought, time, devotion, and consideration, not only on truth but conveying truth to the
reader. It is for the reader; the reader was ever in mind. Having placed one's name on it, the
author declares responsibility for the content. On the shelf, it represents the author’s contribution
to a world of persons. It embodies time spent and life exerted, and it recalls to mind even the
place(s) at which it was written and perhaps circumstances of life as well. Most important, it
embodies an earnest appeal to be taken seriously, to be read, and to be judged.
Though criticism or judgment principally concerns the book’s content, the ultimate object
is the author. Reviewers speak of the author’s thoughts and knowledge, not the thoughts
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themselves. And yet the written thoughts and thinker who produced them could or typically
should be separated. Book reviews are rather strange in this regard and helpful to reveal the
nature of meaningful work. The judgment of a work is rightly on its content or material, but
because one cannot separate the content from its producer without losing something important
(and that something is what I’m trying to reveal), the judgment is concurrently and even
principally on the producer of the content. After all, the author does not say “this is my truth,”
but rather “I say this is true,” and yet we do not disconnect the author from that claim of truth.
Though truth is (presumably) independent of the claimer, it is presented as a truth-claim and is
judged as such. To judge the truth-claim is to judge a person as claimant of truth.
This is explained by the fact that we write to communicate ideas in order to participate in
a community of thought; and this community is between persons, each making appeals
concerning truth to other persons. In affirming or denying someone’s truth-claim, one assumes
already that the author is one who can make claims, namely a person—one who can say “I
think.” Saying “I disagree with you” is an I-you encounter by which one affirms the other’s equal
personhood and one's right and ability to make truth-claims (though one might still be superior in
knowledge on the point at issue). The thought, true or false, facilitates the recognition of mutual
personhood.
But of course those making the claims want others to agree. The proposed truth is
accompanied by an appeal: if true, then it ought to be a common judgment of truth. You are
satisfied when another agrees with your claims only if they earnestly considered them, but not
when they agree thoughtlessly. The producer wants a worthy judgment, especially from one
whom the author respects. This satisfies the author as a contributor to the good of the collection
of persons composing the community of thought. Even in rejection, however, there is a sort of
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contribution: what is not true helps to narrow towards what is true. Of course, rejection is not
very satisfying. But it is more satisfying than in those too-frequent cases when one’s work is
never judged or receives little attention. In these cases, one’s aspirations to be a person among
persons by means of thought are never recognized, either through affirmation or denial. Despite
the work being complete, one’s work or labor is left empty. The book on the shelf becomes an
embodiment of false hope, wasted time, life exhausted without recognition and rejuvenation.
As I said, literary labor and small-scale production are two species of this genus, and
therefore essentially different, which means that there is a principle of difference between them,
each possessing a specific difference.22 The products of artisanship do not communicate
personhood through ordinary language and, for this reason, cannot contain an explicit or implicit
“I” with a clear referent. Personhood is concealed and communicated outside ordinary language,
using significations of quality, making such communication more difficult and in need of a close
community. A theorist of craftsmanship,23 Peter Korn, who is an artisan himself, recognizes
these similarities and differences:
In many ways, the coffee table in my living room and the desk at which I sit are like
the book that you are reading. Each came into being through creative process in which
I explored ideas about life. When I am making furniture, I think with things; when I am
writing I think with words. Both methodologies are powerful tools....Although both
furniture and books carry ideas, there are significant differences between them, such as
how they sequence information....A craftsman cannot control a respondent’s path
through this information as tightly as an author, but the craftsman has the advantage of
making complex structures of information simultaneously apparent. His picture is
worth the proverbial thousand words.24
One might think of the principle of difference as the ground or basis for the difference in
species and the specific difference as the consequence of applying the principle.
22
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The principle of difference between artisanal and literary work appears to be the mode of
communication—the specific differences consequentially being the signification of thoughts
with words for sequential consideration (literary work) and thoughts with qualities25 for
immediate, simultaneous consideration (small-scale production). Despite their differences,
however, the experience of work in literary work serves as an experiential foundation for
understanding small-scale production.

These qualities include capacities, sensible (or passive) qualities, form and figure, all of which
admit of degree.
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Chapter 4. Small-Scale Production
Small-scale production is meaningful work because all that is comprehensible (as to
conceptual content) of meaningful work is true of small-scale production. I provide little
discussion on its extension (i.e., on the range of concrete productive activities to which it
applies).26 I discuss artisanship in detail in this essay (see chapter V) not because meaningful
small-scale production applies only to artisanship but because such work is a useful synecdoche
for a description of meaningful small-scale production. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to discuss
non-industrial land-based production, or small-scale farming. Being a sort of subspecies with
artisanship, small-scale farming work reveals in part the nature and possibilities of artisanship.
“He’ll think he owns it.”
We begin with a fictional account given by the novelist John Steinbeck. In his Grapes of
Wrath, Steinbeck frequently describes farmers’ relationship to land and the product of labor. For
example, he writes the following:
The tenant [farmer] pondered. ‘Funny thing how it is. If a man owns a little property, that
property is him, it’s part of him, and it’s like him. If he owns property only so he can
walk on it and handle it and be sad when it isn’t doing well, and feel fine when the rain
falls on it, that property is him, and some way he’s bigger because he owns it. Even if he
isn’t successful he’s big with his property. That is so.’27
The land is “part of” the farmer. His emotions are tied to it. His being is bound up in it. In his
work on the land, he has made an image of himself. It is “like” him, and in effect “the property is
him.” The need for sustenance does not fully explain this intimate connection. The farmer cares
for the property not merely on account of its productive capacity and his potential of acquiring
wealth. The farmer/property link is analogous to a parental/child relationship: the parent feels
See Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) for a recent
discussion on different types of craft.
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when the child feels, and parents even want to feel with the child. This work on the soil has
generated a relation constituted by an extension, through labor, of self-concern and self-regard to
land.
Later in the narrative, Steinbeck writes of desperate and propertyless small farmers
cultivating “secret gardens” on uncultivated land owned by another. A sheriff comes along and
says to them, “I had my eye on you. This ain’t your land. You’re trespassing.” The man responds
to the sheriff, “The land ain’t plowed, an’ I ain’t hurtin’ it none.” The sheriff replies, “You
goddamned squatters. Pretty soon you’d think you owned it. You’d be sore as hell. Think you
owned it. Get off now.” The narrative continues:
And the little green carrot tops were kicked off and the turnip greens trampled. And then
the Jimson weed moved back in. But the cop was right. A crop raised—why, that makes
ownership. Land hoed and the carrots eaten—a man might fight for land he’s taken food
from. Get him off quick! He’ll think he owns it. He might even die fighting for the little
plot among the Jimson weeds. Did ya see his face when we kicked them turnips out?
Why, he’d kill a fella soon’s he’d look at him. We got to keep these here people down or
they’ll take the country. They’ll take the country. Outlanders, foreigners.28
Much could be said about this passage, but one point in particular is most relevant here. The
chief offense was not the destruction of sustenance. Nor was the cop most concerned with the
food itself. Rather it was about the cultivated land—land that one has “taken food from.”Arising
from cultivation is a sense of ownership, a sense of “mine”—a claim that is not in itself and
originally a legal claim to property but something extra-legal. It follows the ancient principle,
codified by Cicero, that the place that each one occupies is his own.29 As Pierre Proudhon wrote,
the occupation of land is “a place possessed, not a place appropriated,” which works to
28

Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath, Ch. 19.

Cicero, De Finibus, translated by Harris Rackham (Loeb, 1931), Book III.20 “But just as,
though the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken
belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of
justice militates against the possession of private property.”
29

25

“annihilate [legal] property.”30 The cop and the desperate farmer knew that something unique
had been generated between the worker and this spot. Trampling over crops was, for this reason,
more than material destruction; it was an attack on the farmer himself. He had no legal right to
the land he cultivated—a right that would be backed by a third-party, the state. He nevertheless
can feel, and perhaps assert, an extra-legal claim to the product and perhaps even to the land—a
claim backed by the worker himself who stands out from the boundary with strength and resolve
intent on conserving his own as an act of self-preservation. The cop knew that if such activity
continues, “they’ll take the country.”
There is an unmistakable Lockean theme present in the narrative, though Steinbeck takes
it a step further. In his Second Treatice of Government, Locke argued that something becomes
one’s property after “he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own.”
In addition to “mixed” and “joined,” he uses the words “annexed” and “added” for things that
ground a property right.31 But these terms seem to be metaphorical. After all, productive labor is
not a thing that one mixes with material. It is an activity. Locke employs nothing literal or
empirical to account for this “mixing.” And indeed there is nothing empirical or material about
the relationship generated in production. The body is not joined to the soil. As metaphorical,
there must be a literal referent, something that remains hidden or unstated in Locke’s exposition.
Locke seems to be missing a necessary connecting element between labor and property. Property
ownership is a legal claim—something backed by law, a human artifice, against another. But if
people have an extra-legal claim to the soil and material on which they’ve labored, then what is
the ground of that claim?
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of
Government, Translated by Benjamin Tucker (Humboldt Publishing Company 1890), II.2.
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The mediating element that can ground property-claims is the same connection between
worker and product or soil that this essay seeks to describe. It is an extension of concern and care
imputed to the thing by the thing’s creator, arising from the time, energy, thought, care, and life
put into it. Locke’s view of property, as interpreted by Steinbeck, contains an unstated premise,
namely, that a phenomenological relation arises between worker and the products of the worker's
labor due to the activity performed on it. The person as worker has extended some sense of self
to the soil, elevating it from something foreign to familiar. In Steinbeck narrative, the farmer’s
personality manifests from the soil such that an outside offense against the land is an offense
against the man himself; and moreover the very act of cultivating, reaping, and consuming
generates an extra-legal sense of “mine” so strong that it might even challenge a legal and
arbitrary claim to property.
This discussion of Locke is not meant to provide novel insight into his account of
property; indeed, it is unlikely that Locke had any phenomenological producer/product relation
in mind.32 Nevertheless, his account, though used later to justify the liberal economic order, does
seem to support the assumptions of Steinbeck’s narration. In justifying property acquisition
beyond mere “universal consent,” as seen in Grotius and Pufendorf, and in grounding property in
some relation between the person, activity, and product, the Steinbeckian Locke suggests that
such property-claims are mediated by something prior and unstated in Locke, namely some
extra-legal phenomenological connection. The importance for us is not in a possible
phenomenological grounding of legal property. Rather the point is that productive activity can
generate a deep-seated, extra-legal connection that motivates one to stand in its defense, as if in
For this reason, my discussion of Locke is not intended to challenge individualist
interpretations of Locke, such as C. B. MacPherson’s “possessive individualism.” See his The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017).
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self-defense, not by appealing to some third party (e.g., the state) to secure the claim, but by
one’s own independent self-assertion for it before others, demanding recognition as if the
product is an extension of oneself.
Labor as an Extension of Life
Moving away from small-scale farming, we will now discuss some of Karl Marx’s early
thought. In much of Marx’s analysis he has large-scale operations in mind, but his description of
labor reveals the possibility of extending “life” into one’s products, an important element in my
account of meaningful work. But more importantly a discussion and critique of Marx allows us
to clarify, by rejecting some of Marx’s ideas, the importance of the mode of labor—the particular
type of concrete labor—in the possibility of work as an end in itself.
In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, written before Das Kaptial, Marx
writes a fascinating chapter on “Estranged Labour.”33 Seemingly borrowing from Locke, he
states that “the product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has
become material: it is the objectification of labor. Labor’s realization is its objectification.” For
Marx, this objectification does not produce property, at least not for the producer. Of course, in
the capitalist mode of production, the product is immediately the property of the capitalist. But
products in general and in themselves are labor embodied, a sort of public manifestation of labor.
The “worker put his life in the object,” he writes. The product then is alien to the worker because
it is an objectification of life-expenditure: “Whatever the product of his labor is, he is not.” For
Marx, productive labor producers a unique relationship between producer and product: the
product is an “external existence” of one’s “inner world.” The producer gives or transfers life
into the product and “now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object.”
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated by Martin Milligan
(New York: International Publishers, 1964), 106-119.
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Marx is using metaphorical language. “Life” refers not merely to the “expenditure of
brains, nerves, and muscles.” It refers in addition to an extension of self, an extension that
involves a loss of more than bodily energy. In the expenditure of life, the worker suffers a “loss
of realization.” By extending one’s aspirations out into things that pass one by on the assembly
line and are brought into an impersonal social relation of production, one loses oneself in the
world of things.
For Marx, the liberal economic order concealed reality—the reality that workers worked
directly for one another, not for things. The real social relations of production are between
fellow workers. But the market exchange concealed this reciprocal relationship. Workers falsely
thought that their labor was for things; labor was only the means to a wage—a mere means. But
for Marx, the expenditure of labor-power is the mutual person-to-person giving of life—an
activity ultimately oriented towards persons, who are ends in themselves. Labor was actually an
act of rejuvenation for another: the mutual giving of life. One gives of one's inner world and
another gives in return; it is a mutual for-others activity. The true relation of production was
ultimately a relation of reciprocation between persons. And when capitalism falls, the veil will
be stripped away and this relation will finally be explicit in the world.
If Marx is correct, then meaningful work is possible in both large-scale and small-scale
production, making the sort of “petty-bourgeois” artisanship, which he dismissed in his
Communist Manifesto as nostalgia, unnecessary.34 There is however a widely acknowledged and
serious problem in classical Marxism. But that problem helps reveal the possibilities of
meaningful work in small-scale production. I show this below.
First however I want to explain why this is important for the argument. In part, I want to
salvage Marx’s account of labor as a person-to-person mutual giving of life by demonstrating its
34
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possibility in small-scale production. Workers can expend life for another, even with the fall of
Marxian economics, but only in certain conditions. The inability for people to work for one
another is not due to false consciousness, nor to the fetishization of produced things. Rather what
is essential is the nature of the work itself—that it is meaning-investing activity. And the product
itself, when made in a particular way, is what facilitates the very life-to-life rejuvenation Marx
speaks of. Personal relations of production is not between laborers viewed as conducting
“abstract labor.” Rather persons work for one another by means of particular labor-activities in
community; and the resulting product is the vehicle of that appeal.
Relying on the Labor Theory of Value, Marx argued that the capitalist economic system
conceals from workers the fact that they ultimately “work for one another,” as I said above.35 He
reached this conclusion by following the liberal economic theory of the time (particularly David
Ricardo’s economic theories). With Adam Smith, he believed that the true value of a product is
not tied to its use-value or its exchange value, but by the amount of labor-power expended to
make it: the “productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscle.” This is “abstract
labor” or the “expenditure of labor power in general,” labor without reference to any particular
mode of production (i.e., “concrete labor”). When the products of labor reach the exchange, they
take on an exchange value equivalent to the “socially necessary labor” time put into them. For
example, if some linen took one hour to weave and a coat took two hours to tailor, the exchange
ratio would be 2 to 1. The “price”of a coat is two units of linen. There is nothing unique about
this formulation; it is standard classical economics.36 But where Marx takes this is innovative. He
argues that the market exchange conceals what is actually going on in the act of exchange. It
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward
Aveling (New York: The Modern Library, 1906), 82.
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creates a system of relations between things, yet these things are merely the products of abstract
labor. He writes,
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of
men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that
labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total to their own labour is
presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the
products of their labour….There is a definite social relation between men, that assumes,
in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.37
Underlying the exchange value, and that which the exchange conceals, is the labor-power
exerted to make the products. For Marx, the end of work is not the product; it is the other worker.
For this reason, the seed of communism is already contained in the liberal order: the workers
already work for one another. It is, however, concealed by their obsession with things. The
“fetishism which attaches itself to the product of labour”38 is made possible by the “mistenveloped” arena of the exchange, bringing about the “estrangement of man from man.”39
For Marx, when workers mature from a class in-itself to a class for-itself, it will
overthrow the unnecessary and exploitive capitalist apparatus—such as property, the market
exchange, and the capitalist class—and continue, for the most part, what they were already doing,
viz. working for one another with the same jobs in the same factories. The communist revolution
simply unveils the true nature of things. Once the capitalists are removed, the human species
proceeds into the next stage of social development.
Since workers ultimately work for one another in a classical Marxian system, work is
directed toward a proper end, namely, persons, and in so doing they reciprocate life and the
mutual affirmation of each other as ends in themselves. In liberal economies, workers expend life
37
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to make an object that is bought to the market. Their work and their relationships to others as
workers are only means to something else. The termination of ownership in the exchange under
capitalism does not serve, on Marx’s account, to rejuvenate or restore the life one put into the
product. The worker in this system works only to eat and eats only to work. By dispensing with
the fetishism, workers discover the true nature of their work, namely, that it has a real and
worthy end, others persons.
But Marx’s reliance on classical economics proves to be problematic for Marxian
economic theory. The Labor Theory of Value, which was integral to Smith’s and many of the
19th century economists’ theories, is largely rejected today and it came under fatal attack soon
after Marx’s death. Reflecting a general consensus today, Economist Thomas Sowell writes,
By the late nineteenth century, however, economists had given up the notion that it is
primarily labor which determines the value of good, since capital, management and
natural resources all contribute to output and must be paid for from the price of that
output, if these inputs in the production process are to continue to be supplied. More
fundamentally, labor, like all other sources of production costs, was no longer seen as a
source of value. On the contrary, it was the value of the goods to the consumers which
made it worthwhile to incur the costs required to produce those good—provided that the
consumer was willing to pay enough to cover those production costs….It is not costs
which create value; it is value which causes purchasers to be willing to pay for the costs
incurred in the production of what they want.40
Production cost is no longer the source of value in the market. The cost of labor is one important
factor in decisions concerning production, but it has little to no direct bearing upon the price at
exchange. It does not determine price.
This has serious consequences for classical Marxian economic theory. While liberal
economic theory could modify itself in light of this development, the Marxian account, which so
stressed the concealed relations of production between workers, suffered a fatal blow, in my
view. There is no underlying relations of production based on abstract labor. Workers do not
Thomas Sowell, Basic Economics: A Common Sense Guide to the Economy (New York: Basic
Books, 2011) 286-287.
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work for one another as Marx argued. The market exchange does not conceal social relations.
Workers do not project their ideals upon products and thereby avoid some higher level of
species-being. There is no seed of communism in the liberal economic order.
But as I’ve suggested above, this failure of classical Marxism does not require us to leave
behind the idea of labor as an activity for others—as an activity ultimately between persons and
as an activity that expends and extends life. It was after all the French polymath Jean Charles
Leonard de Sismondi (1773-1842), whom Marx identified in his Manifesto the great defender of
the petite bourgeoisie, who was one of the first to identify the “social labour” inherent in
production. He called attention to the “reciprocal cares and duties” that bind people together in
small-scale production.41 Turning Marx on his head, my argument shows that it is actually
through the relation between products (or “things) that we work for one another, for products can
be, when produced in the small-scale, reasons-bearing things through which we recognize the
reason-givers.

See Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi, Political Economy and the Philosophy of
Government; A Series of Essays selected from the Works of M. de Sismondi. (London: John
Chapman, 1847).
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Chapter 5. The Meaning in Artisanship
The discussion now turns to the meaningful work of artisanship. In artisanship, one
generally uses tools and machines in the service of the worker's production. In large-scale
production, however, laborers generally service the machine in its production. Though both types
of work require skill, meaningful work requires that the worker's relation to tools and machines
does not preclude or obscure the worker’s acting with intention upon the material. Hannah
Arendt provides a helpful distinction: in industrial capitalism “it is no longer the body’s
movement that determines the implement’s movement but the machine’s movement which
enforces the movements of the body.”42 In serving machines, there is no need for a mental image
of the finished product; one does not intend upon the material in the process of it becoming a
product. The focus of the laborer in this setting is not the product at all; rather the laborer's
attention is on the machine that makes it. There is often little mastery required, only habituation
into a mindless, rote activity.43
Another distinguishing mark is the immediate application of artisanal skills to a product.
That is, the application of skill acquired by direct experience with material, exercised with
independence and free agency. Traditional craftsmen of the 19th century “worked at the pace
which their craftsmanship demanded,” states historian E. P. Thompson.44 They followed the
“mystery” of their trade, rooted in “customary traditions of craftsmanship.”45 They served the
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community and knew the material they formed. George Stuart, in his Wheelwright’s Shop, a
celebrated account of his wheelwright trade published in 1923, wrote,
In them was stored all the local lore of what good wheelwright’s work should be like.
The century-old tradition was still vigorous in them. They knew each customer and his
needs; understood his carters and his horses and the nature of his land; and finally took a
pride in providing exactly what was wanted in every case. So, unawares, they lived as
integral parts in the rural community of the English. Overworked and underpaid, they
none the less enjoyed life, I am sure. They were friends, as only a craftsman can be, with
timber and iron. The grain of wood told secrets to them.46
The “secrets” of the material was “real knowledge” communicated and learned only through
hands-on experience with the material. It is the “practical knowledge”or mētis, as James C. Scott
has labeled it—the sort of knowledge that “resists simplification into deductive principles which
can successfully be transmitted through book learning” and is essentially “knowing how and
when to apply the rules of thumb [of a craft] in a concrete situation.“47 Far from binding one to a
rigid tradition, mētis is “plastic, local and divergent,”for practical knowledge is a sort of cunning
relation to the unexpectedness of the material and the productive process and changing local
needs.
In experience, an artisan is one with the tools and thereby is united with the material in
the act of shaping and forming as one continuously imposes one's will in and for it. In such
activity, one has annexed oneself to the material. That is to say, the one acting, the tools being
used, and the material being acted upon, are effectively united in the worker's experience. This is
not magic or mysticism. Rather I’m describing the way in which practical knowledge in
production brings the material into an intimate relation in experience with the one working it. In
concerted and concentrated effort, using judgment and deliberation—as if acting and reacting
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with good manners and subtlety to the complexities and irregularities of the material, making
choices and taking risks—there arises a relationship between person and product, adorning that
product with a superadded, immaterial meaning that is intersubjectively recognizable.
Peter Korn helpfully discusses meaning in artisanship.
When we say an object has meaning...we are measuring its emotional importance to a
respondent....Some of the most common ways in which a craft object attains meaning
for a respondent are through information coded into the object by the maker; through
the experience of discovering or acquiring the object; through a personal connection
with the maker; and through provenance or projection....However it happens, objects
ultimately possess meaning to the extent they affect or confirm the stories through
which a respondent constructs his identity and orders his world.48
As Richard Sennett states in a discussion of pottery and brickmaking in The Craftsman, there is a
human tendency to “become particularly interested in the things we can change,” a tendency that
he calls “material consciousness.”49
In The Nature and Art of Workmanship,50 David Pye defines "craftsmanship" as “any
kind of technique or apparatus, in which the quality of the result is not predetermined, but
depends on the judgment, dexterity and care which the maker exercises as he works.”
Craftsmanship is “workmanship of risk,” as opposed to “workmanship of certainty” (which
characterizes modern industrial labor). There is risk in craftsmanship because the outcome is
uncertain, for such work is continuously an “approximation” toward the end.51 But this risk of
failure is a necessary consequence (and perhaps motivating factor) of craftsmanship. Since the
craftsman “intends”qualities for the product, the product manifests the craftman’s agency in the
product’s creation. Pye writes, “Thus the quality of workmanship is judged [in both soundness
48
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and comeliness] by reference to the designer’s intention.....Good workmanship is that which
carries out or improves upon the intended design.”
Workmanship of certainty, however, relies necessarily on predetermined quality and
products produced simply ex opere operato; and as a result, the worker cannot identify with the
qualities of the product.52 In service to a machine, this worker intended indirectly to make the
product, but the worker has not intended anything particular about it. The worker bears no
responsibility for any particular quality. Responsibility comes by applying “judgment, dexterity,
and care” in production.
When following a design, the worker is an “interpreter” and thereby still doing
workmanship of risk. This interpretive work is like a judge seeking to understand a statute
instituted by a legislature or like a pianist interpreting a musical composition, for the “eye and
mind can discriminate things which can never be specified or dimensioned.”53 Intending the
design is sufficient to gain responsibility for the quality of the resulting product. The product
discloses itself to the worker as an embodiment of the worker's intentions and, in consequence,
the worker identifies with it as an objectification of labor and subsequently assumes
responsibility for it.
Marx in his Manuscripts describes the objectification of the worker in the products of
labor. What distinguishes humans from animals is the human ability to “confront” the product of
one’s labor. Non-human animals cannot distinguish “life activity,” including productive activity,
Fredrick Winslow Taylor, the theoretician of “scientific management,” instructed factory
owners to make “all possible brain work...centered in the planning and laying-out department”
and “remove” it from the “shop.” As Matthew Crawford rightfully comments, “Once the
cognitive aspects of the job are located in a separate management class...[the job] requires no
ongoing judgment or deliberation.” See Matthew Crawford Shop Class as Soulcraft: As Inquiry
into the Value of Work (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 39.
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from itself: “it is its life activity.”54 Humans have “conscious life” from which “man freely
confronts his product.” Marx continues:
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man first really proves himself
to be a species being. This production is his active species life. Through this production,
nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the
objectification of man’s species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness,
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world
that he has created.55
Humans create a human world that is an objectification of labor, taking on a distinctive
character “in accordance with the laws of beauty” that humans can contemplate and gaze upon as
if a mirror from which reflects their species being. Since “labor is...the objectification of man’s
species life” it is, or can be, an end in itself, for by it humans fulfill distinctively human
features—their difference of species, namely, rational activity towards the human telos. But
when the object of one’s production is torn away, this “species life [becomes] a means,” not an
end in itself. As we’ve already shown, Marx incorrectly saw this potential in all labor. Only a
particular type of labor makes this possible—that of the small-scale producer. The fact that the
producer is a human being is not itself sufficient for human objectification in the product. Still,
Marx recognizes something important, namely, that workers can produce products as
objectifications of labor that serve as the means for workers to contemplate themselves as
workers.
Relying on these accounts of work, we can further explicate the nature of artisanship.
Upon the termination of labor, a product of work is the objectification of one’s labor and, in
consequence, is a potential object to contemplate the goodness of the laboring activity. At this
point in the productive process the product is potentially a social product, meaning that it has the
54
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potential to serve as a vehicle through which others recognize the producer. It has not yet entered
the social world through an exchange, nor is it available for others’ consideration. Still, such
products meet the conditions to become a social product that facilitates inter-personal relations.
In other words, since one recognizes oneself in and is bound up with the product due to the type
of laboring activity put into it, the product possesses the potential to extend the laborer into the
public by it. This potential is the first necessary condition of labor as an end in itself.
Having one’s aspirations and intentions bound up in these things, producers desire to
make them public—to manifest themselves to the world through them. As Alexandre Kojeve
writes, the worker “recognizes his own product in the World that has actually been transformed
by his work: he recognizes himself in it, he sees in it his own human reality, in it he discovers
and reveals to others the objective reality of his humanity.”56 Being the sole contemplator of
one’s own work is not enough. Matthew Crawford, a trained philosopher-turned motorcycle
mechanic, writes that an artisan wants “to see them [i.e., his products] in use; this completes my
activity of making them, and gives it social reality. It makes me feel I have contributed to the
common good.”57 This objectified labor, or the public manifestation of the person as worker, has
a “social currency,” says Crawford, for “the effects of my work were visible for all to see, so my
competence was real for others as well.”58 Following Kojeve, he argues that small-scale work,
both in the creation of new things and in repairing old things, “manifest[s] oneself concretely in
the world” and good work provides “satisfaction,” for the worker “can simply point: the building
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stands, the car now runs, the lights are on....The tradesman must reckon with the infallible
judgment of reality, where one’s failures or shortcomings cannot be interpreted away.”59
This satisfaction necessarily requires the judgment of others in reference to the producer
by means of the product’s qualities, an act made possible by the embodiment of a person’s
concrete work in the product. In this way, judgment is directed not toward this product, but
toward this worker’s product. Consequently, the work is completed as an end in itself, for in
judgment a person is firstly recognized by persons as a person who worked, and secondly, if the
judgment is positive, one is recognized as a person whose work was good and for the good of
others. Hence, the work affirmed oneself as a person and others as persons and thereby was
worth doing for its own sake. For any activity performed for the affirmation of personhood is
worth doing for its own sake. Before discussing judgment further, I must further describe the
features that make judgment possible.
There are objective and subjective features of all products of labor. The objective features
refer to what is intrinsic to the product—the form and material. These are intrinsic features,
because they concern what is true of it apart from any human relation to it. The subjective
features, however, are extrinsic to the products, for the ground of such features are the way or
ways that humans relate to their form and material. That is, such features are realized by a
relation with something outside it and hence can be lost when that relation is eliminated. These
are the efficient and final causes of the products. The final causes are generated by the efficient
cause, and in this case the nature of the efficient cause—being a human worker and working in a
particular mode—determines the possibilities of the resulting final causes in the product.60
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Since the mode of activity in the efficient cause can vary and the mode of activity
establishes the possibilities of the imposition of ends upon the material, not all modes of labor
can generate all possible features. Some modes can generate more and higher-order features than
others. In this account of meaningful labor, therefore, the efficient cause takes on crucial
importance, for the producer is not merely a creator but a sustainer of the relation. The efficient
cause is an active cause. Indeed, the difference between the two types of labor is a matter of
whether the agent of creation becomes a sustainer of what the product is in its totality upon
completion of it and upon exchange. Let’s proceed in describing these features in detail.
The lower-order set of features arise from the shaping and forming of material into some
thing relevant for human use, so that, upon encountering it, people relate to it not only as a kind
of thing but a thing for something. That is, they relate to it as an object not merely present but
also ready for use or as gear for our various activities. The products at this level of inquiry have
therefore both intrinsic features, such as its material and form, and extrinsic (or intersubjective)
features pertaining to the product’s function or use in human activity. These features do not
require any sustained relation between producer and product, for the use of any product requires
only the recognition that it is useful. Furthermore, the scale of production is irrelevant to the
realization of this set of ends in the product. A chair is for sitting and can be recognized for such
activity regardless of whether it was made by hand in a shop by a skilled artisan or by a machine
in a factory. This is the level of use and market value—like a house that one occupies without
reference to or consideration of it as a home. It is simply a house among houses. These features
something (material cause) from something (privation) to something else (formal cause), the
change being necessarily effected by some agent (efficient cause) whose action may be
presumed to be of a characteristic sort and productive of a characteristic result (final cause).” See
Aristotle (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), 49. What should be controversial in
my account is not the use of Aristotle’s final cause but what I identify as the possible final causes
in craftsmanship (e.g., personal ends), which I describe below.
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are what constitute these objects as human things. Two chairs, one factory-produced and the
other by an artisan, have overlapping (though not entirely the same, as we’ll see) final causes:
they are both for sitting. Both disclose themselves to humans as for sitting, regardless of the
mode of their production.61
When only these extrinsic features are possible, given the mode of labor, the worker
relates to the product as something only with use-value and exchange-value, having no further
relation to it. This is the relationship of the large-scale worker to the products of large-scale work.
They are disclosed as things useful and perhaps represent the efforts exerted to receive a wage.
But the relationship does not extend beyond this. Since the products lack any feature
transcending right of use, the producer’s relationship to the products ceases at the act of
exchange (or upon the termination of labor-activity in the case of wage-labor), which results in
the complete separation of the producer from the product. Indeed, the worker has no concern in
principle as to whether the product is sold and used, either properly or improperly, or directly
thrown in the trash. The laborer is concerned only with the achievement of the sale, being bound
up with the success of the product on the market only because success in the market ensures
wages or revenue. This makes such labor only a means to an end.

Sismondi discusses the two modes of production: “Whenever great capitals are united, and a
great workshop rises up, and different sorts of work are accelerated and concentrated under the
same management, so that from the same edifice, the same factory, may be given out cloth made
of what was, four and twenty hours before, a fleece on the back of a living sheep, the
chresmatistic school utters cheering cries of admiration, it extols to the clouds the prosperity of a
country where one man can every day load a vessel with cloths, or hardware, or earthenware,
sufficient for many thousands of his fellow men; but what a strange forgetfulness of human kind
never to inquire what becomes of the man which the great factory has displaced! For, in short, all
the consumers which it furnishes were not before without clothes, nor without tools, nor without
earthenware; but they provided themselves from those hundreds of little tradesmen who formerly
lived happy in independence, and who have disappeared to make room for one millionaire in the
mercantile world.” Political Economy, Accessed 4/17/2017 at
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1963#Sismondi_1287_263.
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These second and higher-order set of extrinsic features arise in small-scale labor by
elevating labor into personal relations, making the productive activity worth doing for its own
sake. These features arise in an analogous way to how rights arise from our own sense of self, as
claimants of our own self-hood in relation to our activities in the world. In creating something
new by deliberate and free action for some human end, the person as worker identifies with it as
a manifestation or objectification of oneself and consequently imputes to the product further
personal ends—ends directed by means of the product towards other persons—and thereby adds
to the product’s final cause. In relating to a product as an embodiment of our person qua worker,
we consequentially assert claims upon others through it.
But these claims are not property-claims. They are not claims for the right to use, nor for
the possession of these products. They are what I’ll call phenomenological claims, being extralegal and pre-political. That is to say, these products disclose themselves to workers not
according to meum et teum, but rather as meum et pro bono vestro. It is mine and for your good.
The aim is for something higher than domination or acquisition. It is a claim concerning oneself
with regard to the qualities of the product—for others to witness and attest to in their use. And
since the claim is bound up in a manifestation of personhood, it is ultimately the assertion of a
right, not to possession, but to affirmation and judgment. For this reason, whether the product is
another person’s property is irrelevant to the phenomenological claim. As Marcel Mauss said of
gifts, “the objects are never completely separated from the men who exchange them.”62
Moreover, these are not absolute claims, demanding only one sort of response—
affirmation. Rather they are relative claims as appeals to others for their evaluation and
confirmation—for their judgment, and not an uncritical one. We assert the goodness of the
Mauss, Marcel. 1990 (1922). The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.
(London: Routledge, 1990 [1922]), 31.
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products and its goodness for others and with anticipation of their judgment. And in the assertion
we appeal to the other as a person with the faculty of judgment; and we expect to be judged as a
person. But the objects of that judgment are the reasons offered by the person on behalf of one's
work, for as I’ve said a human person is one who offers reasons or justifications for one’s
activity. The reasons or justifications offered in the case of persons qua workers are the qualities
of the product deliberately imposed upon its material by the person’s efforts. Such qualities are
the direct objects of one’s judgment, serving both as the ground of the product’s valuation and,
most importantly, as the vehicle or medium through which persons judge the goodness of the
person qua worker.
The recognition of persons as workers seems to require the proper use and respect for the
product; for if the phenomenological claim endures past the exchange, then the extent of the right
of use is delimited (at least ethically, if not by law) by the enduring claim of the worker. The
product is after all an objectification of the worker's person as laborer. Like the farmer’s anger in
the spoiling of his small crop, the ill-treatment of products is ill-treatment of the producer. In
treating the product well, the consumer or owner recognizes it as the manifestation of another
person as worker, which eo ipso recognizes the person who produced it. For this reason, while
the phenomenological claim does not demand a right of use, it does demand that others use the
product well.
By bringing one’s product, and with it oneself as laborer, to the realm of judgment and by
others receiving that product into the realm of judgment, both the producer and consumer affirm
each other as persons, for only persons have the faculty of judgment. It’s a mutual giving-ofoneself: one asserts goodness for judgment and one evaluates as judge. The very openness for
judgment, which occurs prior to the act of judgment, affirms the personhood of others.
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In this openness, the producer recognizes one's social nature, both with a relative (not
absolute) deference to the judgment of community and as a possible shaper of its common
judgment—or the sensus communis. The producer takes into account the judgment of others in
order to avoid, as Kant says in a slightly different context, “the illusion arising from subjective
and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a
prejudicial influence upon its judgment.”63 The producer asserts reasons into the community, by
means of the qualities of the product, for evaluation by collective public reason. Just as we go
about the world asserting ourselves in this or that way in our various activities in the social world,
testing ourselves for, with, and against others in order to adjust our being in the world as coparticipants in the world, so too do we with the products of our labor. This openness expresses
both a willingness to modify one’s work in light of judgment and an aspiration to shape
consensus. It it governed by the ongoing question, “how is my laboring going?” The intent is the
pursuit of perfection as one continues to shape and react to social consensus. At the same time,
meaningful work is not simply a matter of reaction and conforming to others’ judgment, nor is it
a defiant and oppositional statement of “I exist!” that elevates labor into a sort of “politics of
presence,” which ultimately is rejected by the community as anti-social. Rather it is the yearning
for positive participation in shaping social judgment and belonging.
The need for common agreement does not preclude a bold and confident assertion of
quality, nor does it require a blind acceptance of the community’s evaluation. This yearning is
not a lack of confidence, as if one is desperately in need of approval. Korn insightfully describes
products of craftsmanship as “objects as emissary.” He writes,
The objects I made had significance for me because they embodied my evolving ideas
and beliefs. But at the same time, to truly assume the identity of craftsman, I need to
inform my social environment so that others would see me that way, too. After all,
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constructing an identity is not a self-contained project. One’s sense of self is a
fluctuating assemblage of beliefs and feelings strongly influenced by external
circumstances, especially the beliefs of other people. To become a craftsman I had to
coax the narrative of others down the trail I was blazing. The things I made were
emissaries sent out into the world to negotiate on my behalf. They influenced the
beliefs of others regarding my occupation and capabilities.64
The assertion of reasons through qualities in products is one aspect of participation in a local
community. Confidence in one’s work does not preclude the desire to join others in conversation
about it—to shape and react to others and adjust oneself in light of the conversation. Crawford
describes the need for craftsmans' “individuality” to be “expressed in an activity that, in
answering to a shared world, connects him to others: the customers he serves and the other
practitioners of his art, who are competent to recognize the peculiar excellence of his work.”65
Often the principal judges of the community are part of a specialized group within the
community, such as members of guilds and trade unions who serve as sort of middle-men
between the craftsman and the community at large.
To summarize this chapter thus far: with regard to products of work, judgment’s direct
objects are the products and their qualities; it’s principle is goodness in terms of the product’s
soundness and comeliness; it’s means is respectful use and fair evaluation; and it’s ends are,
firstly, the affirmation of the person manifested in the product and secondly the judgment of the
person qua worker. Yet the origin of judgment is the producer’s address to the
consumer/evaluator by means of the product’s qualities as reasons made from person to person.
Hence, the subjects of judgment are both the producer and the consumer as persons. And since
anything done for the sake of others in reference to their personhood is an end in itself, such
work in judgment is an end in itself.
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Given the discussion so far, there are three basic higher-order features imposed upon
products of work: (1) the manifestation of oneself in the world as a worker for the common good,
(2) the claim for recognition from persons as a person qua worker, and (3) the claim for a fair
judgment in the evaluation of the products (which, when a positive judgment results, perfects the
work by confirming that it contributed to the common good). All three (i.e, manifestation,
recognition, and judgment) are essential for labor to be an end in itself. That is, they are enough
to elevate labor into a person-to-person realm of recognition and reason-giving. But a good
judgment—that one’s reasons are judged to be good reasons—perfects such labor, for labor is
completed in the realization of is principal end—the good of others. While a negative judgment
in a labor-affirming community still affirms the for-others intention of the person who produced
it (and thereby the person who intended), the intention is proven to be ill-suited to the end in
view. Such work, despite affirming personhood, remains incomplete.
As I stated in the introductory chapter, the exchange of products, though it is necessary
for work to be an end in itself, is only ancillary to that end. Put differently, the artisan does not
work for the sake of exchanging the product, as if work is a means to that end; rather the
exchange is a condition, not the ground of, the good of meaningful work. The achievement of the
good of meaningful work then occurs, at this level of analysis, at a time after the product is
completed and only when the product is taken up in the community for use and judgment. The
good then is realized retroactively—the worker comes to relate to past work as having been
worth doing for its own sake, since the conditions for such work were subsequently met in the
community.
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Small-Scale Community
The rational pursuit of work as an end in itself requires, as I’ve said, working in and for a
community. Community is necessary because by it the I of the worker becomes a you to another,
and in that way the work is elevated into personal relations. That is to say, one encounters
another in the product of work at the personal level—as an I/you encounter, for as I’ve argued
the product has a higher-order feature that addresses persons. Similarly, a worker can identify
with the product as mine only if another is able to say yours, for a right in relation to a thing is
possible only if one can make a claim against another. Furthermore, without another to whom
one can assert reasons of quality there can be no reasons there at all, for reasons exist only when
between persons. Indeed, without community a worker saying “I am responsible for this” is futile
and, more importantly, meaningless, for having responsibility for something assumes the
exclusive possession in some way among others. If no one exists who will recognize this
responsibility, then there is no actual responsibility. In seeking responsibility in the absence of
the requisite community, the worker should be pitied: It is the assertion of an I without a
reciprocating you—a vain, empty, and meaningless assertion of responsibility for the products of
labor. The labor and subsequent consumption proved to be impersonal and therefore the labor
was but a means to an end—the revenue or wages to sustain further laboring.
We’ve focused so far on two separate groups, producers and consumers/users, but we
must recognize that in personal relations of production all producers are also consumers, which
means that, in such relations, the workers work for one another. That is, they consume or use
each other’s products of labor in mutual recognition and judgment. Each producer then is
reciprocating life to other producers through the reciprocal effect of recognition and judgment.
This is realized by the scale and the nature of the community. Just as the scale of labor is
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essential to meaningful work, so too is the scale of the civil community. Instead of a civil
environment of boundary-less universalism or cosmopolitanism, the realization of workers
working for one another occurs only in particular settings—in small contexts and a people with a
sense of local belonging that extends across generations.66
Hannah Arendt on homo faber
A discussion of Arendt’s thought on work will help us make further distinctions
pertaining to work and community. In The Human Condition, Arendt distinguishes the animal
laborans and the homo faber. The former is Marx’s laborer under capitalism: one works to eat
and eats to work. In labor, products “immediately become...means of subsistence and
reproduction of labor power.”67 In “making” (which is her translation of faber), however, “the
production process comes to an end” in the product. That is, man as maker produces things not
for a direct end of powering further labor, but to make an “independent entity [that] has been
added to the human artifice.” The laborer “never transcends” the labor process, for the laborer is
endlessly producing and consuming.68 Transcending the labor process, for Arendt, is the
production of durable goods.

As I said in the introduction, this small-scale requirement is complicated by the internet. The
internet permits various forms of communication from great distances, including reviewing,
feedback, and marketing. The necessary community that was once possible only in a
geographically bounded space is now possible at the global level. But this might actually benefit
small-scale producers, who are often unable in modern economies to compete locally with larger
firms. Global exposure increases demand. But still face-to-face interaction is generally more
honest and authentic, and the producers, as members of the local community, will be able to
respond to local needs.
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Durability, according to Arendt, gives things “objectivity” that allow them to endure the
“voracious needs and wants of their living makers and user.”69 They “stabilize humans,”
allowing people to “retrieve their sameness, that is, their identity.” The homo faber creates an
enduring world of things to which one goes for meaning and a sense of permanency.
Furthermore, the maker of things, says Arendt, “conduct[s] himself as lord and master of the
whole earth.” The laborer, on the other hand, is still nature’s servant, for only durable objectified
labor transforms nature. Arendt further distinguishes between “consumer goods,” which are for
mere life and produced by animal laborans, and “use objects,” which are for the human world
and produced by homo faber. The world of use-objects (durable things) facilitates the production,
exchange, and consumption of consumer (or ephemeral) goods.
Contrary to Arendt, my account recognizes that given the type of work and type of
community, even those who make products that quickly spoil can transcend the “life-cycle” of
production and consumption by entering into a person-to-person realm of reason-giving through
their products. The loaf produced by a baker must be consumed quickly after production, but it
still can facilitate a person-to-person reciprocation and thereby raise the labor to an end in itself.
This work then is not only a means to continue working, though it certainly does that. The
product of that work also serves as a means of recognition and judgment of the person qua
worker. The product’s lack of durability is irrelevant in this regard. Arendt’s distinction between
animal laborans and homo faber then does not apply to my account of small-scale production.
Indeed, people today who conduct homo faber, according to her definition, work in large-scale
settings and therefore have little to no connection to their products. If my account of meaningful
work is correct, then the local baker conducts more meaningful work than most manufacturing
laborers.
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But Arendt’s distinction is still useful, for even though the products of both ephemeral
labor and durable labor can facilitate personal reciprocation, the durability of the durable
products permits an extension of life embodied in the product and creates a human world.
Arendt was quite right that “without a world [of relative permanence] into which men are
born and from which they die, there would be nothing but changeless eternal recurrence, the
deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal species.”70 The production of
durable goods provides the “reality and reliability of the human world.” It is “world-building.”71
This is the “thing-character” of the social world. Arendt did not say, but could have, that in
identifying with one's product and in society’s identification of the producer through it, the
producer in a way remains in the community post-mortem. Not only do the products themselves
remain after death, the producer endures in the world as work objectified, as if memory is lodged
in the things left behind. The very familiarity one has with the world is a result of the dead’s
abiding work existing in the present for the living. It “give[s] rise to the familiarity of the world,
its customs and habits of intercourse between men and things as well as between men and men,”
writes Arendt.72
This generational significance of durable goods causes people to labor for future others
(viz. the unborn) in their production, not only for living others. As Crawford states, “People who
make their own furniture will tell you that it is hard to justify economically, and yet they persist.
Shared memories attach to the material souvenirs of our lives, and producing them is a kind of
communion, with others and with the future.” Thus the person works for the good of those both
present and future, seeking the recognition even from those not yet born. Production of durable
70
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goods, therefore, transcends both the life-cycle of the animal laborans and the present. In effect,
the presence of these workers endures past their death in the things they made.
Hence, meaningful work serves as a connection between the dead, living, and unborn—
what Edmund Burke called the “eternal society.”73 It is a community that exudes in its built
environment the dead-living-unborn mutual connection: a living people, whose work is made
possible by the abiding contributions of the dead, working to welcome the future generations.
Communities often know only temporarily, if at all, who made this and that thing. We are
usually ignorant of who made, for example, this sidewalk or who planted this tree. So it would
seem that our limited knowledge impedes our ability to recognize and affirm others in their work
across generations. This is true however only in reference to the individual level: I or she did this.
At the collective level, a people would simply say we made this—the one has become subsumed
into the collective. The totality of one’s particular relations—family, community, etc.—is bound
up in the products of work such that these things belong to us as we belong to the producer. After
all, if the worker can relate to products as manifestations of labor in the world, then family
members can relate to those products as they relate to the worker (e.g., family heirlooms). And
what about nations? If we can relate to one another as a combined people, then each can relate to
"Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may
be dissolved at pleasure — but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a
partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, or tobacco, or some other such low
concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the
parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes
a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those
who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause
in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures,
connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the
inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place."
Reflections, 96-7.
73
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the product according to that relation. Mistreatment of some product would, therefore, affect all,
not only the producer. Three conclusions seem to follow: 1) we can identify with the goodness of
a fellow member’s meaningful labor as in some sense our work; 2) recognizing one as a person
qua worker recognizes all; and 3) the judgment upon the product is pronounced on all of us. This
explains why dumping French wine into the gutter might offend the citizens of France.
Affirmation of work seems therefore to be a collective one. It is a total social fact or, to
use Mauss’s term, it is part of the “the gift”—the pervasive norms of reciprocation that transcend
the individual through generations. Instead of having only one person in mind in working, in a
personal relations of production the person is subsumed under the social such that all work for all;
and the society in turn collectively recognizes and affirms the goodness of our work, a sort of
giving back to themselves the rejuvenation of life—a collective will to live. In this socioeconomic system there is therefore no strict requirement for face-to-face feedback (though
certainly this would still occur); nor is work principally an end in itself retroactively. The
recognition and affirmation of one as a person qua worker is part of the collective affirmation of
itself as a distinct and stable people. Hence, it is not a matter of I and you. Rather it is a matter of
we—we have responsibility for all of this.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
More could be said about the community and how work relates to generational linkages.
We must leave undeveloped here a detailed account of the civil order that coheres best with this
view of work. It certainly lends itself to certain “third-way” perspectives, such as the “economic
humanism” of Schumacher, the humane economy of Wilhelm Ropke,74 the “gift economy”
model, and distributism, among others.75 The thought of social theorists, such as Jacques Ellul,
who critiqued the “technique” in the liberal order,76 and Wendell Barry77 and Joel Salatin, who
have criticized corporate farming practices and other features of modern economic life, cohere
well with my account of meaningful work. Even some small-scale liberal economic orders could
work as well. However, I see nothing in my account that necessarily condemns wage systems,
property, or the market exchange, though versions of each would prove detrimental or
destructive of meaningful work. Furthermore, there can be instances of personal relations of
production in local communities and perhaps in isolated establishments even in the most
deracinated of liberal economies. But there is no room to discuss all this in detail.

Ropke writes, “If we want to be steadfast in this struggle, it is high time to bethink ourselves of
the ethical foundations of our own economic system. To this end, we need a combination of
supreme moral sensitivity and economic knowledge. Economically ignorant moralism is as
objectionable as morally callous economism. Ethics and economics are two equally difficult
subjects, and while the former needs discerning and expert reason, the latter cannot do without
humane values.” A Humane Economy, 103-4.
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I've emphasized that meaningful work requires a community seeking forms of life in
common that, at least in some small way, distinguishes them from others, not in a jingoistic
fashion, but as a quiet, peaceful, and self-affirming community pursuing the common good
across generations. In such a community, people know each other as more than individuals in
mutual alliance for self-interest; rather they are a people desiring to communicate one to another
their gifts for the best collective life possible—to live well. Meaningful work plays a central role
in that. As E. F. Schumacher rightfully said in Small is Beautiful,
Above anything else there is need for a proper philosophy of work which understands
work not as that which it has indeed become, an inhuman chore as soon as possible to
be abolished by automation, but as something ‘decreed by Providence for the good of
man’s body and soul.’ Next to the family, it is work and the relationships established
by work that are the true foundations of society.78
But replacing the foundation of society is as hard as it looks. Still, when looking closely, there
are places in the Western world that fight for meaningful work. One example will suffice.
There is a small restaurant in Oxford, Alabama called Garfrerick’s Café. Here the
excellent food is complemented by an atmosphere of collective ownership. The workers do not,
to my knowledge, own as legal property any portion of the business, but the restaurant owner has
brought them into the life of the business. The chefs cook in a sizable portion of the main floor
separated only by a row of seating similar to bar seating. This allows diners to interact with the
chefs and compliment directly to them on the quality of the food. It brings everyone into a
producer/consumer relationship that affirms everyone involved. Added to this, the small farm
associated with the restaurant, owned by the restaurant owner and from which comes much of
the food served there, is a place of learning for the chefs, waiters and bartenders. The owner
brings them into the farm-to-table process. It is an option for the workers to join this process by
visiting and working on the farm. The workers then are part of a family of sorts in which the
78

Schumacher, 38. See also Schumacher's Good Work (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
55

satisfaction of the customer satisfies the family. The owner has deliberately followed an
important principle: he has brought his workers into face-to-face relations with their customers to
confirm the qualities of their work.
This essay then is firstly not a critique of the current economic order, though it does that
in consequence. Too many critiques of current conditions call for grand political schemes with
ends that are hopeless to realize or wildly impractical and even violently disruptive. My account
of meaningful work however establishes a way forward that can find partial realization in little
unseen ways—in the quotidian aspects of life with face-to-face interactions in praising others for
their work and in expressions of gratitude to those who worked before us.
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